Sergei Glebkin

Assistant Professor of Finance,

Working Papers

Strategic Trading without Normality

I present a model of strategic trading a la Kyle (1989) that does not require the assumption of normally distributed asset payoffs. I propose a constructive solution method: finding the equilibrium reduces to solving a linear ordinary differential equation. With non-normal payoffs, the price response becomes an asymmetric, non-linear function of order size: greater for buys than sells and concave (convex) for small sell (buy) orders when asset payoffs are positively skewed; concave for large sell (buy) orders when payoffs are bounded below (above). The model can speak to key empirical findings and provides new predictions concerning the shape of price impact.

Liquidity vs. Information Efficiency

I analyze a market with large and small traders with different values. I show that illiquidity and information efficiency are complements. Policy measures promoting liquidity might be harmful for information efficiency and vice versa. An increase in risk-bearing capacity may harm liquidity. An increase in the precision of information may harm information efficiency. Increasing market power or breaking up a centralized market into two separate exchanges might improve welfare. Multiple equilibria, in which higher liquidity is associated with lower information efficiency, are possible. Applied to crude oil market the model highlights (1) informational frictions and (2) market power of producers amplified by (1) as possible drivers of recent sharp price changes.

Capital Market Equilibrium with Competition Among Institutional Investors (with Dmitry Makarov)

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to study how competition among institutional investors affects the stock market characteristics - level, expected return, and volatility. We consider an economy in which multiple fund managers strategically interact with each other, as each manager tries to increase her performance relative to the others. We fully characterize an equilibrium in this economy, and find that a more intense competition is associated with a higher level of the market, lower expected market return, while market volatility is not affected by competition. These findings are broadly consistent with the data.

Work in progress

Strategic Price Dispersion in OTC Markets (with Ji Shen)

Uncertainty and Equilibrium in Supply Function Games (with Marzena J. Rostek and Ji Hee Yoon)